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Abstract 
This article reviews and consolidates the most recent literature on comparative institutional analysis, 
and links this to endemic crises, continuities, bounded diversity and change in HRM practice within 
and between nations. It is argued that national institutional arrangements both support and sustain 
particular sets of HR practice, but this is always contingent, and subject to the choices of actors: firms 
adopt practices both to take advantages of the unique advantages of a particular national system and to 
cope with the challenges it imposes.  Even potentially sub-optimal sets of institutions may help 
sustain particular sectors and types of firms, even in the face of great external shocks. At the same 
time, the two most developed national institutional paradigms – Coordinated and Liberal Markets – 
have faced ongoing challenges and adjustments. Most notably, Coordinated Markets faced painful 
adjustments and challenges in the 1990s and early 2000s; more recently, this has been completely 
eclipsed by the unprecedented political crises that have enveloped the largest Liberal Markets, and 
which both reflect realities in work and employment relations, yet have potentially serious future 
implications for HRM.  
Introduction  
In comparing HR practices between countries, three issues become immediately clear. The first is that 
there are clear concentrations of particular types of HR at both regional and national lines.  Secondly, 
there are large concentrations of poor quality work and employment relations in many emerging 
markets, and, increasingly within Liberal Markets.   Thirdly, there are strong pressures worldwide on 
existing HR models; whilst the dominant pressures may be reducing work standards , there are signs 
of counter movements. 
For employment relations to take place, one has to have a formal or informal employment contract, 
and some element of predictability.   Whilst this is the norm for work and employment in the 
advanced societies, in many emerging markets, this is the exception, rather than the rule. And, even in 
a number of advanced societies, there are significant numbers of illegal immigrants, and other highly 
precarious workers, who work under conditions that would fall outside of what could be considered 
the modern employment relationship (Gottfried, 2014).  Standing (2011) argues that there has been a 
growing global trend to ever more precarious employment and occupational security.   And, even 
when formally constituted employment relations exist, it can be argued, that there have been strong 
external pressures towards greater insecurity and more hardline HR policies.   Whilst the reason for 
the rise of the field of HRM in the 1980s and 1990s was in part due to the decline of traditional 
collective contracts, and a desire to more closely manage employees on individual lines (Wilkinson 
and Wood 2014 a ) it also reflected efforts to promote the value of cooperative forms of HRM on 
business case, and, to some extent, ethical, lines (Johnstone and Wilkinson 2016, Collings and Wood 
2009).   
 
The literature on comparative capitalism was  a valuable corrective to the globalisation thesis which 
suggested all countries would go down a neo liberal deregulated path in pursuit of flexibility with 
pressure on labour costs undermining the role of unions. (Barry and Wilkinson 2011.) The notion that 
all would follow a single route has been criticised for neglecting what some have identified as path 
dependency –simply put, the past constrains future choices and this suggests we will find nationally 
distinct pathways. In other words rather than rush down a single route to economic success it is more 
likely that employers “will seek to confront new market challenges by building on and deepening 
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previous sources of comparative institutional advantage “ (Thelen and Kume.2006 p12) .In short 
employers are likely to work with existing institutions, for example lifetime employment in Japan or 
centralised wage bargaining in Europe rather than abandon them.  
 
Although there are many different strands to the literature on comparartive capitalism, the Varieties of 
Capitalism (VoC) literature (Hall and Soskice 2001) was particularly influential in driving a major 
theoretical rethinking through  drawing our attention to how different national economies can be 
structured and regulated in different ways This has implications for the organisation of employment 
relations.  Between the most developed economies, the VoC literature has drawn out a distinction 
between Liberal and Coordinated Market Economies (Hall and Soskice 2001).   The former 
represented the developed Rhineland economies of continental north Western Europe, Scandinavia 
and Japan, and the latter the developed Anglo-Saxon ones; it was argued that in each, there were 
strong institutional pressures encouraging and reinforcing particular modes of HRM (Hall and Soskice 
2001; Whitley 1999; Dore 2000).   This works follows on from other work also seeking to distinguish 
between different types of capitalism, notably Albert’s notion of the Rhineland approach to capitalism 
in contrast to the Anglo –Saxon free market model or Crouch and Streeck who contrasted institutional 
capitalism with market oriented capitalism. VOC takes a largely firm centred approach in explaining 
capitalist diversity but also attributes a strong influence to national systems of regulation in the areas 
of labour market regulation, corporate governance and education and training. A key issue is how 
employers co-ordinate themselves, and the quality of ties between them. Much of the work draws 
from the field of comparative political economy.(Gould et al 2015)  
This literature represented the product of both concerns as to the relative viability of different models 
of national economic organization and associated firm level practices, and to promote at the very 
least, the equal worth of Coordinated Market Economies (CMEs) to Liberal Market ones (LMEs)  
(see Hall and Soskice 2001; Whitley 1999; Martin 2014, Morgan and Hauptmeier ,2014, Wood et al 
2014).  During the early 2000s, this seemed quite optimistic, given escalating neo-liberal reforms 
worldwide; more pessimistic strands of the comparative capitalism literature suggested that 
institutional arrangements in CMEs were progressively unravelling (see, for example, Streeck, 2009).    
However, since then, the German model has revived, the Japanese economy has continued to defy the 
doomsayers, whilst the two largest LMEs have been engulfed by populist extremism as a result of 
structural economic shortfalls, above all, a structural failure to secure decent work, secure retirement, 
and, indeed stable incomes for the bulk of the population.    
Yet, whilst undeniably influential, the literature on comparative capitalism has been quite sketchy as 
to the precise nature of firm level practices nurtured by specific institutional configurations, preferring 
to focus on broad ideal types (Wood et al. 2014); only recently has the literature been extended 
through more detailed studies of firm level practice. It is the purpose of this special issue to explore 
the linkages between instutitons and practice, through bringing to bear new evidence from both 
mature and emerging institutional settings. 
 
Comparative Capitalism and HRM: The First Wave of Literature 
Although the 1980s were marked by drifts to more extensive neo-liberalism in the LMEs of the US 
and Britain, they were also marked by the rise of interest in the CMEs, and, especially Japan, given 
the latter’s strong export performance, and, indeed, partial eclipse of competing industries in the 
former economies (Dore 2000).   Integral to the latter’s success was cooperative forms of HRM, 
enabling a degree of quality and flexibility that appeared elusive in LMEs.  This also served as the 
basis for business case arguments that the driving out of traditional forms of employee representation 
in LMEs brought with it great risks unless alternative forms of genuine employee representation could 
be developed.  Lincoln and Kalleberg (1990) provided a close exploration of the relationship between 
Japanese institutions and firm practices and compared it with that of the US. Whilst it was argued that 
Japanese forms of HRM incorporated some superior, cooperative features, the linkage with embedded 
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institutional realities made it difficult to emulate.   Parallel work by Ronald Dore (2000) reached 
similar conclusions; the emphasis on shareholder value in the US stood in sharp contrast to the 
emphasis on social compromise and stakeholder value in Japan and other coordinated forms of 
capitalism.  In looking at intra-organizational practices, these approaches concentrated on work 
organization and very specific dimensions of HRM: the nature and extent to which employees had a 
say in the organization of work, and shared knowledge between themselves and managers, and how 
this translated into quality and flexibility.   There was only limited concern with other dimensions of 
the HR function, such as pay and rewards, although it was recognized that greater mutual commitment 
within more coordinated economies translated into lower staff turnover rates and the nurturing of 
organization specific capabilities.   
The Hall and Soskice (2001) collection imparted a broader sweep to such arguments, arguing that all 
societies would ultimately evolve into either LMEs or CMEs, as these were the only forms of 
capitalism associated with advanced complementarities (c.f. Crouch 2005). The latter may be defined 
as sets of rules of features that, in interacting, yield a greater sum of gains than individual 
interventions might yield (Hall and Soskice 2001; Lane and Wood 2009).   In LMEs, a focus on 
flexible labour markets and generic tertiary skills is combined with mobile and active investors, 
adversarial competition and ‘thin’ relations both between firms, and between them and other societal 
actors (Hall and Soskice 2001; Deeg and Jackson 2007; Jackson 2010).  Within the firm, this 
translates into ‘arms length’ contracting, wage flexibility, job insecurity, and weak collective 
employee voice, with skills and knowledge being secured via the external labour market (Hall and 
Soskice 2001; Whitley 1999).    Although this may be seen purely in negative terms, this enables 
firms to optimise shareholder value release by rapidly adjusting to external circumstances; high job 
mobility alleviates some of the consequences of adversarial competition, by spreading firm specific 
knowledge within and between sectors (Thelen 2001).   In CMEs, ‘thick’ or dense ties between firms 
in the same sector allows for the development of a broad industry wide knowledge and capability base 
(Deeg and Jackson 2007); this also may support a strong sector relevant vocational training system 
supplemented by the development of organization specific human capital encouraged by high levels 
of job security (Thelen 2001).   Unions and other forms of representative voice are relatively strong in 
such contexts, facilitated by the higher degree of mutual commitment between firms and their 
workers; this both helps reinforce good terms and conditions of work and the effective harnessing of 
worker insider knowledge to improve both quality and production efficiencies (Hall and Soskice 
2001; Jackson 2010; Whitley 1999; Brewster et al. 2007, Fairbrother 2014 ).     
Quite simply, LMEs were characterised by more ‘calculative’ or ‘harder’ and CMEs with ‘softer’ 
HRM (Jackson and Kirsch 2014; Brewster et al. 2007).  This does not mean that HRM in the former 
was necessarily less sophisticated. Rather, it was held that the type of share-based reward system 
aimed at senior managers incentivised them to maximise shareholder value (Boyer 2010); contingent 
rewards aimed at more junior employees similarly encouraged a focus on the bottom line.  Highly 
developed tertiary educational systems in such contexts provided generic skills sets that facilitated 
mobility between industries, but at the same time, provided the advanced skills and knowledge that 
facilitated innovation in high-technology industries (Boyer 2014).  However, in exploring what was 
complementary in LMEs, internal diversity and change in the latter was downplayed.  As Wright and 
Dwyer (2006) note, a long term trend in LMEs has been towards a the destruction of ‘good’ middle 
jobs in traditional areas of economic activity such as manufacturing; for every new hi-tech job created 
in the ‘knowledge economy’, there have been many more created in low end service work.  HR 
practices in the latter are certainly about contingency, but they make little usage of other features of 
the LME model such as a good generic knowledge base (see Wilkinson et al. 2014b).   Not only is pay 
modest, but it is often simply fixed to the statutory minimum or as little as the external labour market 
will bear, rather than in any manner linked to performance.   Again, high staff turnover means that 
firms have to devote a great deal of resources to basic induction training; high training spend denotes 
more systemically generated inefficiencies than any commitment to HRM (see Goergen et al. 2009).  
Meanwhile, intensified outsourcing and offshoring has reduced the basis of employment in core hi-
tech firms; this has meant that an increasing proportion of value has been directed to those in the 
highest job grades and owners, at the cost of present and potential future employees.  
4 
 
Some of the contributions to the Hall and Soskice (2001) edited collection provided insights into the 
distinct features in other forms of capitalism, but this was prefaced with the assumption that they were 
still in a process of change, and this would lead them to one of the two mature models (albeit that it 
was acknowledged that pressures towards the LME model were particularly strong).  An alternative 
account by Whitley (1999) mapped out a greater range of alternative archetypes, such as the northern 
Italian industrial districts model and the fragmented business system of economies such as Hong 
Kong.   It also differentiated between European and Asian coordinated market (Whitley 1999).   
However, in common with the Hall and Soskice collection, an abiding concern was the relationship 
between institutional mediation, and the relative incidence of cooperative HR policies, combining a 
high degree of delegation with investment in people and relative job security (Whitley 1999, Allan 
2014).     A limitation of both accounts was an implicit assumption of path dependence; rules and 
features developed over many years in a path dependent and linear manner (Hollingsworth 2006). 
Whilst national systems do continuously evolve, established complementarities are not easily 
abandoned, and key players will naturally tend to shore up institutional features that work for them 
(Crouch 2005).  Again, although making quite wide ranging assumptions as to the relationship 
between institutional setting and HRM, these assumptions were founded on broad macro-economic 
trends, supplemented by limited and at times anecdotal evidence (Wilkinson and Wood 2012 ,Wood 
et al. 2014).    
Second Wave Accounts: Greater Diversity and Change  
The latter set of assumptions was challenged from two distinct quarters.  The first was from the camp 
of historical or ‘old’ institutionalists, who argued that such approaches neglected both the impact of 
formative historical events, and long run historical tensions between state and market mediation 
(Sorge 2005; Streeck 2010).  If the process of institution building is relatively unusual and the product 
of very specific historical circumstances, then it makes it very difficult to emulate or substitute 
institutional arrangements (Sorge 2005; Streeck 2010). Actors do not necessarily like or support far 
reaching social compromises, and typically only do so when all other known alternatives have been 
exhausted (Sorge 2005). At the same time, they will naturally seek to erode any systemic constraints 
on what they wish to do, especially when emboldened by the course of time (Streeck 2010; Sorge 
2005).  This naturally drives quite strong pressures towards liberalization (Streeck 2009).  Streeck 
(2005) recognizes there are, in line with Polanyian assumptions (1944), strong counter pressures 
towards statism, driven by the contradictions and crises of excess marketization (Streeck 2005).  
However, the path between state and market is a sidereal one, and at different times will assume 
different forms; this makes contemporary neo-liberalism quite different to past manifestations 
(Streeck 2010).  From a broad Social Systems of Production (SSP) perspective, Hollingsworth (2006) 
suggests that, mirroring the evolutionary process encountered in the natural world, systems evolve in 
an episodic and uneven manner, characterised by periodic blind alleys and ruptures.     What does this 
mean for HRM?   For Streeck (2009), the overwhelming conclusion is a pessimistic one; any form of 
arrangement that supports relative workplace democracy, decent pay and job security will naturally be 
challenged by employer interests; in the contemporary age, there are strong pressures toward the 
unwinding of institutional mediation in CMEs.    However, Thelen and Jackson  are  somewhat more 
optimistic and, in  recent work, has pointed to the continuous importance and relevance and of the 
German vocational training system as an example of the durability of some of the defining features in 
CMEs (Thelen 2014).  And, as we have seen, most recently, the two largest LMEs appear to have 
been much more successful in generating structural economic challenges and internal political crisis 
than ever attained by Germany during the costly and disruptive unification process, or Japan during 
the so-called ‘lost decade’. 
The second challenge to the dichotomous Variations of Capitalism approach was from work that 
suggest that there were not two but many potential forms of capitalism; complementarities were 
possible in other types of economy, and even if institutional mediation was less than perfect, there 
were strong continuities (Crouch 2005).  Hence, for example, whilst there were strong pressures to 
liberalization in the emerging markets of Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean world, they retained 
enough benefits to insider interests and/or the challenges of institutional substitution were so 
daunting, as to make continuity quite likely (Hancke et al. 2007).  In other words, rather than being on 
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a path to something else, they represented quite mature, even if somewhat less successful, models in 
their own right.  Different economies encompassed different combinations of key institutional 
features; the process of hybridization meant that no national economy represented a ‘pure’ form 
(Amable 2003).     This led to attempts to identify further capitalist archetypes to encompass the 
developing world, including Segmented Business Systems (tropical Africa), Hierarchical Market 
Economies (Latin America), familial capitalism (Asia), and Petroleum Growth Regimes (Middle East 
petrostates).   However, with the exception of the latter, all these economies had some common 
ground in a limited formal sector, supplemented by large – and largely unregulated – informal and 
small business sectors, characterised by insecurity and authoritarian paternalist management, rather 
than any recognizable form of HRM (Wood et al. 2010).   Meanwhile, Petroleum Growth Regimes 
were characterized by modern oil and gas sectors – supported by the strong usage of both highly 
skilled and unskilled expatriate labour – and large public sectors and inefficient manufacturing, the 
latter two supported through oil and gas revenues in the interests of political security (Mellahi and 
Wood 2010).   But the role of clientalism in supporting staffing in the latter, coupled with a lack of 
interest in enforcing workplace efficiency, should not be under-estimated, nor the corruption of 
political elites; together with currency over-valuation, these features mitigate against the emergence 
and persistence of modern commercial firms, and associated forms of contemporary HRM (as adverse 
to the specialised expatriate and elite centered model encountered in the oil and gas industry). 
However, if all institutional arrangements are subject to change, and if there are many alternative 
forms of capitalism, this raises the question as to both commonalities in global trajectories, and why 
challenges to institutional orders or great systemic crises occur when they do.   In more applied terms, 
the issue emerges that if national institutional orders remain persistently different, why there have 
been global trends towards the decline of unions, the relative strengthening of managerial power, and, 
indeed, strong pressures towards the reconfiguration of more cooperative forms of work organization 
to reflect the relative strengthening of the position of management.   This lead to a third wave of 
literature that centres on the exploration of such issues. 
Capitalist Diversity and Change 
This third wave represents an undeniably diverse range of literature. Firstly, there is the Variegated 
Capitalism approach, which draws heavily on regulation theory (Jessop 2011).   The latter initially 
focused on temporal changes in capitalism, and the challenges associated with finding a more durable 
basis of institutional mediation in the light of the crisis in the fordist paradigm (Jessop 2001; Boyer 
and Saillard 2005).   Later regulationist writing had extended it to cover questions of scale (Jessop 
2011), which ultimately led to the development of national taxonomies broadly compatible with those 
from other strands of comparative institutional analysis (Wood et al. 2014).  Variegated capitalism 
reiterates the extent of common – and crisis ridden - trends in world capitalism, which national 
institutional regimes may mediate or amplify, but can never completely do away with (Jessop 2011).   
In practical terms, these would include great imbalances in the allocation of capital, in trade, and in 
the tensions between private property rights and the type of knowledge sharing necessary for 
sustained technological advance (Jessop 2011). 
Secondly, there has been growing interest in emerging markets. The rise of the BRICS countries (see 
Horwitz 2014)  (and, above all, China) would suggest that such economies are developing 
complementarities in their own right, and, indeed may develop novel forms of institutional mediation.   
More specifically, it has been argued that China has been able to develop quite sophisticated regional 
institutions, supporting some quite advanced industries in some areas, whilst retaining the advantages 
of an ultra-low wage economy in others; bank recycling of peasant savings for firm finance extended 
under highly favourable terms enables industries to withstand adverse competitive pressures, but at 
the cost of over-capacity (Dunn, 2007).   The literature on Chinese HRM links this to the different 
models followed in particular industries, and, indeed, Chinese MNEs when they venture abroad 
(Cooke 2014). 
Thirdly, there are theories of capitalist diversity and change that synthesise the different strands of the 
literature on comparative capitalism (Lane and Wood 2009).  It is argued that the bounded and 
contingent nature of complementarity means that many firms will not reap the benefits the national 
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system accords, and, hence, devise their own solutions (Crouch 2005); such firms may cluster 
together in industrial districts, with close inter firm ties allowing for the rapid dissemination of 
knowledge and much flexibility in production (Crouch et al. 2004; 2009). Still others may partially 
opt out of the more voluntary features of the national system; this allows for lower cost models to 
coexist without endangering the system itself (Lane and Wood 2009).  Secondly, and related to this, 
most nations have strong regional differences (Lane and Wood 2009). This might include variations in 
corporate law, and indeed, legal origin, examples being the United Kingdom (Scotland has a hybrid 
legal system), and Canada (civil law Quebec) (Deakin and Sarkar 2008).   Again, even ostensibly neo-
liberal governments might be more interventionist in specific regions for political reasons and/or to 
offset the most visible costs of their policies (e.g. successive British governments in their policies 
towards Northern England) (Hudson 2006).    Regions with high degrees of autonomy might seek to 
pursue more social democratic solutions, even if operating within a LME national framework (again, 
Quebec and Scotland would be obvious cases in point).      
In HR terms, this would mean that whilst there will not be diffuse diversity in practice, there will be 
more than one national model coexisting, even if one is dominant, or contributes much to the overall 
viability of the system (Lane and Wood 2009; Wilkinson et al. 2014; Konzelman et al. 2012).    For 
example, in Japan, jobs in areas of the service, food and agricultural sectors are much less desirable 
than those offered by the zaibatsu, with commensurately lower levels of voice and pay (Conrad 2010).  
pay (Conrad 2010).   In Germany, the Mittelstand again tend to offer lower pay and less job security 
than the great industrial concerns (Martens and Bluhm 2007). There is also the abovementioned 
diversity in the LME model. This raises an important question for practice.  Is it viable for firms to 
pursue higher value added HR approaches in more peripheral areas of the economy, even that 
institutions are never perfectly coupled and systemic support may be less? Or, would a more stable 
external environment enable their adoption; are peripheral firms too busy with simply coping to 
survive to devote adequate attention to HR 
Related to this is the issue of historical change.  If institution building is often a response to great 
systemic crisis, then it is likely that players will constantly test its limits, in order to maximise their 
own distributional benefits (Hall and Gingrich 2009; Streeck 2010).  At the same time, institutions 
will adapt, with specific features being redeployed to suit new purposes (Boyer 2011, 2014 ).   This 
means that even if there are trends to and back from the mediation of the operation of markets, the 
forms this assumes will vary according to both time and place (Streeck 2005).  Hence, rather than a 
Polonyian pendulum between state and market, Streeck (2005) suggests a sidereal path.   Such broad 
trends would be matched with the repurposing of key dimensions of HR practice. For example, it is 
widely noted that  German works councils were originally a co-determinative mechanisms focused on 
the organization of work, allowing firms to gain insider knowledge from those closest to the process 
of production, whilst affording workers a greater say in what they do (Nienhueser 2014).     In recent 
years, they have gradually assumed some bargaining functions, according a greater degree of 
flexibility and decentralization to industry wide bargaining.    Again, in LMEs, whilst greater 
flexibility in working time may impart greater income insecurity, it may facilitate greater employment 
security (as redundancies are no the default option to secure numerical flexibility), with knock on 
benefits for both employees and organizations; even in contexts where employees are structurally 
weaker, the situation is not always uniformally bad (Wilkinson et al. 2014). 
But, even if institutions matter, it is evident that in most national contexts, the relative power of 
employees has not increased since at least the 1970s, and in a large proportion, this has significantly 
diminished.  This has facilitated a shift towards more hardline HRM models, above all, characterized 
by greater job insecurity and more contingent pay; increasingly careers are something to be secured 
by moves between organizations, rather than within a single one (Kalleberg 2009).  To a large part, 
this reflects not just persistent world systemic crisis, placing many firms in a position of great 
uncertainty, but also the rise of the relative position of owners of highly fungible capital, that is 
investors who are uncommitted to any particular region, industry, or indeed, other grouping of 
stakeholders (Wood 2013).   What sets this grouping apart from the rentiers of yore is that the current 
grouping includes Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs), the investment and intergenerational savings 
arms of many national governments with significant resource windfalls or other export surpluses 
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(Wood and Wright 2013). Whilst it might seem that these might take a more long-termist view, they 
also may serve diplomatic and strategic ends, and, in the case of those from non-authoritarian 
societies, are subject to public scrutiny on their performance.     The long crisis of the first half of the 
twentieth century also coincided with a shift from coal to oil and gas, which both provided new cheap 
energy, but was highly disruptive, marginalizing established industries and processes and those with 
capital tied up in them (both patient investors and workers), whilst opening new opportunities for 
highly mobile investors (Wood and Lane 2012).   Again, since the 1970s, there has been a 
proportional decline of oil and gas in the global energy mix, and historically high and volatile oil and 
gas prices; this has led to the oil and gas industry becoming highly financialized, with a business 
model increasingly characterized by excessive debt leverage .    Interestingly, it is in LMEs that the 
adoption of alternative energy sources has been particularly poor.  Whilst a long energy transition 
affects all nations, persistent capitalist diversity has meant that its effects are more pronounced in 
some than others. Again, in practical terms, this makes for increased global insecurity in both the 
employment relationship and income security.  However, the pressures remain less pronounced in 
CMEs; this allows firms more room to forge or reenergise cooperative HR solutions (Wood 2016).  
 
New Perspectives on Institutions and HR Practice 
 
In this special issue, articles provide insights from around the world, but which share common ground 
in highlighting the durable, but evolutionary consequences of institutions, variations in relative 
institutional coupling, the uneven operation of complementarities, and the extent to which, at the local 
and national level they are malleable through the choices of actors. 
Dibben, Brewster, Brookes, Cunha, Wood, and  Webster, provide  a study of institutional change and 
continuity, comparing the trajectories followed by Mozambique and its formal colonial power 
Portugal in HRM, based on surveys of firm level practices. Despite all the adjustments and shocks 
that have accompanied Mozambique’s post-independence years, the country continues to retain 
institutional features  from the past. This suggests that there is a post-colonial impact on human 
resource management. So features of less mature institutional frameworks  may be sustained for 
protracted periods of time, even with considerable pressures to reform.  
 
Ugarte explores the extent to which the interaction among payment systems and institutional 
arrangements together with internal and external labour market (ELM) dynamics influence gender pay 
processes and career progress for men and women graduates in the banking sectors of Argentina and 
Chile. The more inclusive Argentinian industrial relations system, reinforced by above-market 
collective pay agreements in banking and the economic instability of recent years, has restricted inter-
firm mobility and generated a more gender-neutral distributional pay effect for graduates. By contrast, 
the more decentralised and individually-driven Chilean wage-setting system incentivises Chilean 
graduates to be more reactive to ELM opportunities to improve their wages. However, this greater 
mobility benefits more men than women graduates because women tend to be more attached to their 
organisations. He also finds that  their wage bargaining position is weakened as a result of gender 
stereotyping, which reflects employer prejudices constructed in reaction to family support policies 
that are more generous than those in Argentina. Ugarte argues that the more inclusive Argentinian 
industrial relations system limits gender bias in pay by providing more formalisation, centralisation 
and transparency in pay decisions compared to the more discretionally-driven decisions of the Chilean 
HRM system. 
 
Cooke Yao, Jiang, and  Li, examines the relatively recent growth of the international labour market, 
particularly in the service industry, for temporary employment of university graduates from China. By 
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examining the push and pull factors from the home and destination country, they treat the 
international labour market as a geographic and institutional space which is created by the 
institutional actors and in which these actors interact. They examines the actions and interactions of 
institutional actors at the local level to develop insights into how these actors shape the space of this 
segment of the labour market through, for example, the insertion into the global labour market chain, 
human resources sourcing, training and development. Cooke et al argue that the development of the 
international labour market for Chinese university graduates is contingent upon the agency role and 
attitude of key institutional actors and the current situation sees fragmented development with limited 
government support, institutional capacity and individual motivation. 
Washika Haak-Saheem, Festing and  Darwish  explore the increasingly dominant role of International 
Human Resource Management (IHRM) policies and practices of Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) 
operating in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The existing literature on institutions suggest that 
MNEs are under influence and pressure to adopt HR practices that are viewed as being appropriate for 
the context and situation. However, distinctive institutions in the UAE, and their impacts on MNEs’ 
HRM have been largely overlooked in prior work. With  a particular focus on institutional theory, 
they explore the effects of home-country institutional factors on IHRM in foreign subsidiaries They  
reveal that IHRM practices in this institutional setting are built upon fragile, dependent and uncertain 
conditions, and they are not grounded in the sort of deep and stable institutional foundations prevalent 
in most developed economies.  
Singh, Darwish, Wood and Mohamed study the incidence and impact of specific sets of HR practices 
on organisational performance  across different types of firm, within an emerging market setting that 
of Brunei where institutional arrangements are fluid and developing. The literature on comparative 
capitalism suggests that, within advanced societies, formal and informal regulations are mutually 
supportive, and will be sustained by associated HR systems. In contrast, in settings where institutional 
arrangements are weaker, there will not be the same incentives for disseminating mutually supportive 
HR bundles, and when these do exist, they are unlikely to yield any better outcomes. They found that 
this was indeed the case in the petrostate of Brunei as the usage of integrated HR models did not work 
better than individual interventions. Whilst it is often assumed that, in petrostates, the primary focus 
of institution-building is to service the needs of the oil-and-gas industry, they found no evidence to 
suggest that integrated HR systems were any more effective there; this may reflect the extent to which 
the industry’s HR needs may be simply resolved through turning to overseas labour markets – both 
for skilled and unskilled labour. At the same time, they found that the efficacy of HR practices varied 
according to firm characteristics and that  even in challenging contexts, firms may devise their own 
solutions according to their capabilities and endowments. 
Allen , Liu and Syed comment on how comparative institutional analyses have added much to our 
understanding of HRM in different countries, providing strong arguments against the need for flexible 
labour markets to boost economic performance. However, existing research has tended to downplay 
the possibility that variation within countries may result in a well-protected core of workers that 
grows ever smaller alongside increasing numbers of precarious workers. They draw on data from the 
World Economic Forum and the European Company Survey to examine how institutions influence 
establishments’ use of temporary workers in 29 European countries plus Turkey. They show that 
institutional characteristics shape the prevalence of temporary workers in the 28 European Union 
member states plus FYR Macedonia and Turkey; however, institutions are not deterministic and 
important variation in the use of temporary workers depends upon the interaction between 
establishment characteristics and the establishment’s business system. 
 
Conclusion 
There has been a growing interest in deploying the constructs and frameworks of comparative 
capitalism to understand similarities and differences in the practice of HRM between countries, and, 
indeed, what defines HR practice within them.   Indeed, a case can be made that this has increasingly 
supplanted the comparative framework of cross-cultural approaches, in that the former is better 
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equipped to take account of rapid changes in the relative advantages of nations and consequent 
changes in HR policies and practices. The two largest LMEs face major and ongoing political crises, 
that reflect in part, the collapse of traditional employment paradigms, and the consequent alienation of 
core sectors of the electorate. At the same time, the traditional CME model appears to have 
revitalised. While the literature on comparative capitalism might have provided a theoretically more 
rigorous and empirically more robust mechanism for comparing the practice of HRM within and 
between contexts, it is generally recognized that the relative distinctiveness of national institutional 
frameworks is a great deal more fluid than previously believed. On the one hand, it is possible to 
reform institutional arrangements in one area without the system being undermined.  On the other 
hand, a wide range of factors, from elite bungling and miscalculation through to climate change, may 
diminish the worth of previous systemic strengths.  This raises the challenge of conceptualising 
parallel, but never perfectly aligned processes of reconfiguration in both regulation and practice.   It is 
fitting that this journal, which has focused on the comparative and international analysis of HRM, has 
played such a central role in bringing to bear new applied comparative perspectives that make such a 
theoretical project feasible.   
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